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JUDICIAL RESTRAINING ORDERS AND THE MEDIA:
DOES IT REALLY MATTER WHO IS GAGGED?
James M. Jennings II*
I. INTRODUCTION
Writing in Bridges v. California,1 Justice Hugo Black observed
forty years ago that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most
cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task
to choose between them."2 And yet, these constitutionally guaran-
teed rights have been in conflict since at least 1807.3 In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart,4 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote:
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign pri-
orities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights,
ranking one as superior to the other .... But if the authors of these
guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts between them, were
unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one priority
over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by under-
taking what they declined to do.5
The judiciary in the United States has thus attempted to bal-
ance these two Bill of Rights guarantees. The sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution provide that the guilt or inno-
cence of a criminal defendant will be determined in an impartial
proceeding, free from outside influences." The sixth amendment
also guarantees to society the fair and public administration of jus-
tice. The media, likewise, play an integral role in the public's right
to know about the conduct of court proceedings.7 But the perva-
* Associate Professor of Journalism, Penn State University; A.B., Norfolk State Univer-
sity, 1978; M.S.J., Ohio University, 1980.
1. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
2. Id. at 260.
3. One of the earliest comments on this conflict can be found in United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
4. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
5. Id. at 561.
6. Justice Holmes, in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), summarized the basic
theory of American criminal jurisprudence as follows: "[C]onclusions [are] to be reached in
a case... [based only on] evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print." Id. at 462.
7. The clearest expression of the increasing importance of the media's role in this capac-
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siveness of the media in the last half-century has made the consti-
tutional guarantee of an impartial public trial, free from outside
influences, difficult to satisfys-at least in regard to news coverage
of sensational crimes and the judicial proceedings arising from
such crimes.'
The history of the conflict between first and sixth amendment
rights is marked by the shifting importance of the two, depending
on the particular case before the court. During the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, state courts felt free to use their con-
tempt power to punish newspapers and individuals for making
public comments concerning pending cases. 10 In 1925, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Gitlow v. New York1
recognizing the applicability of the first amendment to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
Sixteen years later, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of a state court's use of its contempt power to
punish private individuals and members of the media for com-
ments made about pending cases. In Bridges v. California a union
leader had been held in contempt because of the publication of a
telegram he had sent to the Secretary of Labor, in which he criti-
cized the actions of a state court. 2 In the companion case of
Times-Mirror Co. v. California, s a newspaper publisher had been
convicted of contempt for publishing an article labeling the defen-
dants "gorillas" and arguing against the granting of probation. 4
ity can be found in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), to be
published at 448 U.S. 555. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976); State ex rel. Supe-
rior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, cert. denied sub nom. McCrea v. Sperry,
404 U.S. 939 (1971).
8. Writing in Nebraska Press, Chief Justice Burger observed that "[tihe speed of commu-
nication and the pervasiveness of the modern news media have exacerbated these [free
press-fair trial] problems. . . ." 427 U.S. at 548.
9. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1977); People v. Speck, 41
Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968); State v. Hauptmann, - N.J.L. -, 180 A. 809, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
10. See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States Since the Federal
Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 525 (1928).
11. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. 314 U.S. 252, 275-78 (1941).
13. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
14. Id. at 271.
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Both convictions had been affirmed by the California Supreme
Court.15 In reversing the decisions, the United States Supreme
Court held that the publications had not constituted a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of justice.1" While recogniz-
ing the importance of the fair trial principle, Justice Black con-
cluded that before a court could use its contempt power to punish
for public comment on a pending case, "the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high." For two decades following Bridges, the Court consistently
upheld the concept of first amendment supremacy in the area of
public commentary on pending cases.1 8
However, in 1961, the Court was faced with a different aspect of
the conflict between first and sixth amendment rights. In Irvin v.
Dowd,1 9 adverse local publicity led the accused to request a change
of venue.°While the request was granted, the case was tried in a
neighboring county equally infected with the prejudicial publicity,
and the defendant's requests for additional changes in venue were
denied. 0 The defendant was eventually convicted by what voir
dire had shown to be a prejudiced jury.21 The Court held that the
trial court's refusal to grant the further change of venue was re-
versible error.22
0
Two years later, in Rideau v. Louisiana,2 the Court reversed an-
other conviction on the grounds that adverse publicity had denied
the defendant due process. The Court held that the trial court's
refusal to grant a change of venue out of an area which had been
exposed to a televised confession was a denial of due process even
without a showing that the adverse publicity had affected the
15. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940); Bridges v.
Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939).
16. 314 U.S. at 278.
17. Id. at 263.
18. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). Bridges and the above cases dealt with nonjury
trials. In Wood v. Georgia, the court stated: "Moreover, we need not pause here to consider
the variant factors that would be present in a case involving a petit jury." 370 U.S. at 389.
In 1950, however, the Court had refused to grant certiorari in a jury case in which a state
court, using the clear and present danger test, had reversed the contempt citation. See Bal-
timore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, - Md. _ 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950).
19. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
20. Id. at 720.
21. Id. at 727.
22. Id. at 729.
23. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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jury.24
The decisions in Irvin and Rideau marked a shift in emphasis
from first amendment rights towards those of the sixth amend-
ment. This shift was completed in 1965, in Estes v. Texas25 where
the Court held that the prejudice inherent in the use of television
in the courtroom was a denial of due process.2 6 The Court wrote
that "the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair
trial-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained
at all costs. 2 7
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,25 the Supreme Court suggested a num-
ber of procedural safeguards which could be employed by trial
courts in an effort to insure the protection of the accused's right to
a fair trial. 9 Support for the most stringent of these safeguards,
the use of the restraining order, is found in dictum of the Court.3 0
These orders, commonly referred to as "gag" orders, restrict either
directly or indirectly what the media can report about judicial
proceedings.
Originally gag orders were aimed at the media as the distributors
of material which could be prejudicial in nature.-' In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, however, the Court looked at a series
of cases cdealing with prior restraints and concluded that "[tihe
thread running through all these cases is that prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights." s2 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, noted that if subsequent punishment
"chills" speech, prior restraint freezes it-at least temporarily.3 8
The Court in Nebraska Press adopted the clear and present
danger test, as interpreted by Judge Learned Hand in United
24. Id. at 726.
25. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
26. Id. at 544.
27. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
28. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
29. These safeguards included change of venue, continuance, voir dire and sequestration
of the jury and the granting of a new trial. Id. at 363.
30. Id. at 361.
31. One of the first judicial gag orders may have been issued by Chief Justice Isaac Parker
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1830. Justice Parker issued a ban on the
publication of any of the "evidence" in the case of Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (1
Pick.) 477 (1830) (Knapp and others charged with murder). See J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE
PREss 115 (1966).
32. 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
33. Id.
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States v. Dennis,3 4 and applied it to gag orders against the media.
The Court then established a three-pronged method by which trial
courts could determine if this test were met. First, examine the
nature and the extent of the harm threatened by unrestrained me-
dia coverage. Second, adjust the gravity of the harm posed by the
probability that the consequences, such as prejudice, will in fact
occur should speech remain unfettered. And third, consider
whether less intrusive alternatives exist which would adequately
protect the integrity of the trial process.3 5
Some commentators believe that the Court's holding in Ne-
braska Press has established a standard so stringent as to preclude
all restraints on the media, even when the alternative is to inter-
fere with an individual's right to a fair trial."6 In fact, direct gag
orders on the media have been consistently overruled upon appeal
since Nebraska Press.37 While the decision seems to have erected a
34. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The test, as interpreted by.
Judge Learned Hand, determines whether the "gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183
F.2d at 212. By adopting Learned Hand's interpretation, Chief Justice Burger accepted the
weakest interpretation of the clear and present danger test. The "gravity of the evil" stan-
dard permits the Court to use a sliding scale on which to judge a possible threat to the fair
administration of justice. Under this standard the clearer, or the more grave, the perceived
danger, the less present the danger need be. This scale is far closer to the "evil tendency"
test than to the clear and present danger test outlined by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). See
D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAw CASES AND CoMMENT 80-81 (3d ed.
1979); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATFRiALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1061-1068 (9th ed.
1975). It is the use of this limited interpretation of the clear and present danger test which
raises questions as to the future course of the Court with regard to this doctrine.
35. 427 U.S. at 563-65. The third prong of this test requires that the least drastic means
of achieving the desired end be employed (in this case a fair and impartial trial). See
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960):
"In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental pur-
pose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."
Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
36. See Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect On Gag Order Litigation of
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 497, 498 (1977); Prettyman, Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen the Last of Prior Restraints on the
Reporting of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Lois U.L.J. 654, 655 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); State ex rel.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fl. 1976); Des Moines Register
& Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976); State v. Rittiner, 341 So. 2d 307
(La. 1977); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977); New York Times Co. v. Starkey,
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significant barrier to the use of gag orders directed to the media,
the Court did not consider the validity of such orders designed to
silence non-media sources of prejudicial information. Since Ne-
braska Press, there has been an increase in the use of gag orders
directed to the prosecution, defense counsel, defendant, witnesses,
and trial participants generally, and in the enforcement of stand-
ing court rules for the discipline of counsel and law enforcement
personnel.3 8
This article will examine this new attempt on the part of the
judiciary to insure a fair trial for the accused and will attempt to
determine if the result of gagging trial participants is appreciably
different than directly gagging the media. The article will also ex-
amine the various standards of controlling the gagging of trial par-
ticipants used in the eleven circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals.
II. GAGGING EVERYONE BUT THE PRESS
A. Legal Foundations.
While the Court discussed the invalidity of the use of direct
gag orders on the media in Nebraska Press,39 it has never directly
considered the constitutionality of such orders when imposed on
the participants of judicial proceedings.40 In dictum, however, the
51 A.D.2d 60, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1976); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46
Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gulf Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Garcia,
456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978); Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists,
Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C.), af'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir.), stay
denied, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); State ex rel. Angel v.
Woodahl, - Mont. -, 555 P.2d 501 (1976); State v. Carter, 143 N.J. Super. 405, 363 A.2d
366 (1976); People v. Dupree, - A.D.2d -, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1976).
39. The Court characterized the use of such orders as a direct prior restraint on the media
and held this to be "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amend-
ment rights." 427 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added). See also note 35 supra.
40. The Court came close to addressing this question directly last term in Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard., 49 U.S.L.W. 4604 (U.S. June 1, 1981) (No. 80-441). The Court, in affirming the
Fifth Circuit, held that a sweeping gag order by a Texas District Court on all parties in a
class action suit in the name of protection of the fair administration of justice abused the
court's discretionary power under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court indicated
its future course in cases involving gag orders on trial participants:
Although we do not decide what standards are mandated by the First Amendment in
this kind of case, we do observe that the order involved serious restraints on expres-
sion. This fact, at minimum, counsels caution on the part of a District Court in draft-
ing such an order, and attention to whether the restraint is justified by a likelihood of
serious abuses.
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Court has suggested that this method of insuring the defendant a
fair trial may indeed be constitutional.41 Several of the United
States Courts of Appeals which have confronted this issue,42 how-
ever, have held that trial participants are entitled to first amend-
ment protection within the context of the individual judicial
proceeding.43
It is generally acknowledged that a court has the power and au-
thority to control the conduct of individuals appearing before it. 44
Further, courts have traditionally held that the sixth amendment
rights of the defendant guarantee him a "fair trial but not a per-
fect one."'45 Recognizing these two concepts, the federal appeals
courts have acknowledged that the use of gag orders on trial par-
ticipants does restrict expression and thus involves the first
... But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a com-
munications ban ....
Id. at 4608 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) ("Professional stud-
ies have. . .[recommended] that trial courts in appropriate cases limit what the contending
lawyers, the police, and witnesses may say to anyone."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
361 (1966) ("[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters .. . or like state-
ments concerning the merits of the case."). See also 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, Ch. 8 at 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS] ("(a) A lawyer shall not release or
authorize the release of information or opinion for dissemination by any means of public
communication.... (b) [A] lawyer may be Subject to disciplinary action with respect to
extrajudicial statements ...").
42. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1969). See also note 37 supra.
43. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council
of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 812 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). Each of these
opinions held court rules prohibiting extrajudicial statements by lawyers to be a violation of
the first amendment rights of the lawyers. But see United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661
(10th Cir. 1969) (gag order on trial participants did not violate first amendment because it
was based on reasonable likelihood that comments could prevent impaneling of impartial
jury and thus affect fairness of trial).
44. See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978);
In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Michaelson v. United
States, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Courts also
held, however, that in regulating the conduct of trial participants, a court may not infringe
upon constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); Staud v. Stewart, 366
F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
45. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974); Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 231 (1973); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
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amendment guarantees. The various circuits have differed, how-
ever, in the ways they have characterized these orders46 and in the
creation of constitutional standards by which to judge them.
At present courts use at least four identifiable standards-the
free speech standard, the clear and present danger standard, the
reasonable likelihood standard, and the authoritarian standard-to
test the constitutionality of gag orders aimed at trial participants. 7
In addition, courts have recognized two procedural
grounds-recognition of media interest and notice to the me-
dia-which allow the media to challenge the use of such orders in a
third party action.48
B. Judicial Standards Governing Restraining Orders
1. The Free Speech Standard
One of the four standards available to the trial judge in examin-
ing the constitutionality of gag orders aimed at trial participants
prohibits restrictions on extrajudicial comments. During the
Watergate trial of former White House aide Dwight Chapin, the
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to grant a gov-
ernment petition requesting that all trial participants be prohib-
ited from making extrajudicial statements. The court noted that
while it had the authority to restrict comments by lawyers and wit-
nesses, it could not prevent the defendant from speaking with the
press "as he chooses" about the case.49
In United States v. Mandel,50 the district court reached a simi-
lar conclusion. In this case the government petitioned the court to
46. The courts have characterized gag orders imposed on trial participants in 3 ways:
(1) a direct prior restraint on expression;
.(2) a valid use of the trial court's authority to protect the interest of a fair trial, and
as such not a prior restraint on expression; and
(3) a combination of the above.
See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (standing no-comment rules more a
"subsequent punishment" than a prior restraint); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (standing no-comment rules similar to prior restraints because they
were punishable by contempt but also different because they were subject to constitutional
challenge), cert. denied sub noma. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912
(1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (direct prior restraint on expres-
sion); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (direct prior restraint on expression).
47. Inaction Continues Gag Chaos, 2 NEws MEDIA & THE LAW 4 (Apr.-May 1978).
48. Id.
49. United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975).
50. 408 F. Supp. 673 (D. Md. 1975).
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impose a gag order on former Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel
and his counsel four and a half months prior to the beginning of
the trial to prevent the "deliberate manipulation of the media in
an attempt to subvert potential jurors." The court acknowledged
that both sides of the proceedings were entitled to a fair and im-
partial trial, but maintained that the government bore the respon-
sibility for showing that the feared publicity would significantly
prejudice the proceedings and that the use of the gag order was the
least drastic means of insuring a fair trial.52 Holding that the gov-
ernment had been unable to make such a showing the court denied
the petition.
The use of a standard such as that employed by the courts in
Mandel and Chapin is rare. But, as is the case with the use of the
authoritarian standard discussed below, the use of the free speech
standard is available as a viable option to the trial judge.
2. The "Clear and Present Danger" or "Serious and Imminent
Threat" Standard
Recognizing that the free speech standard may not sufficiently
curb prejudicial publicity, and that the use of the authoritarian
standard restricts "crucial source[s] of information and opinion," 53
at least two federal circuits have adopted the "clear and present
danger" or "serious and imminent threat" standard" in evaluating
the constitutionality of gag orders issued to trial participants. The
use of these standards allows for a case-by-case evaluation of the
potential danger of prejudice to a fair trial and the administration
of justice.
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,55 the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a lawyer's challenge to standing disciplinary rules" which
prohibited lawyers from releasing information likely to interfere
51. Id. at 675.
52. Id. at 677.
53. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
54. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970) was one of the earliest cases
recognizing that a "serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice," or a "clear
and present danger" of prejudice must exist for a gag order to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
55. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of
Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
56. The rules of United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois embod-
ied DR 7-107 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
1982]
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with a fair trial or to prejudice the fair administration of justice.
After finding the rules unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the
court concluded: "Only those comments that pose a 'serious and
imminent threat' of interference with the fair administration of
justice can be constitutionally proscribed. '57
The Seventh Circuit recognized that a fair trial was a prime con-
cern but concluded that the "reasonableness" standard established
by the district court rules were vague and inconsistent with the
objective of "clearness, precision, and narrowness"58 of the law.
The court maintained that this standard provided a test whereby
"even a trivial, totally innocuous statement could be a violation."59
The court, recognizing the value of public discussion concerning
court proceedings which could be lost through the enforcement of
such tests, noted:
[L]awyers involved in investigations or trials often are in a position
to act as a check on government by exposing abuses or urging action.
It is not sufficient to argue that such comment can always be made
later since immediate action might be necessary and it is only when
the litigation is pending and current news that the public's attention
can be commanded.60
The Seventh Circuit, however, did not close the door on the use
of standing rules to curb statements which met the presumption of
a clear and present danger to a fair trial. Rather, it shifted the
burden of proof from the court to the trial participant, requiring
the participant who disregards such a rule to justify his actions.61
Breaking down the judicial proceeding into its basic compo-
nents-pre-trial, trial and post trial-the court set out to evaluate
the potential for prejudice in each stage. The Seventh Circuit held
that there was a possibility for prejudice only on the part of the
prosecutor during the investigative or pre-trial proceedings, rea-
soning that it is "imperative that we allow as much public discus-
57. 522 F.2d at 249. State courts have similarly held. See, e.g., State ex rel. Angel v.
Woodahl, - Mont. -, 555 P.2d 501 (1976); Markfield v. Association of the Bar, 49 A.D.2d
516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 794, 337 N.E.2d 612, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106
(1975).
58. 522 F.2d at 249.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id. at 250. See also Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 523.
61. 522 F.2d at 251.
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sion as feasible" 62 by the defense counsel, to act as a check on the
prosecution. With respect to the actual trial, the court held that
any rule which prohibited extrajudicial comments relating to
"other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial was unconstitutionally vague.6" With regard to restrictions on
post-trial comments, the court concluded that these comments
could never pose a "serious and imminent threat" to the fair ad-
ministration of justice given the amount of discretion available to
the trial judge at this stage of the proceeding.6
The clear and present danger test has also been used by the
Sixth Circuit as a method of protecting the right of the media to
gather information and to protect the public's right to know. In
CBS, Inc. v. Young,"5 a suit brought by members of the media, the
court overturned a gag order which prohibited extrajudicial com-
ments by all parties in a civil action arising out of the confronta-
tion between demonstrating students and members of the national
guard at Kent State University. 6 In overturning the order, the
court concluded that the order was overly broad:
We find the order to be an extreme example of a prior restraint
upon freedom of speech and expression and one that cannot escape
the proscriptions of the First Amendment, unless it is shown to have
been required to obviate serious and imminent threats to the fair-
ness and integrity of the trial.6 7
The clear and present danger standard gained some support
from the legal profession in 1978 when the ABA adopted the stan-
dard during a revision of its standards governing fair trial and free
press. The new guidelines reject the use of restrictive orders en-
forced by contempt citations in favor of standing orders enforced
by reprimand, suspension, or disbarment .6 The guidelines specify
62. Id. at 253.
63. Id. at 255. (quoting DR 7-107(D) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
which was incorporated into the district court rules).
64. 522 F.2d at 257.
65. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id. at 240.
68. STANDARDS, supra note 41, ch. 8 at 6. The ABA rejected restrictive orders for two
reasons. First, there is the difficulty of drafting such an order so as to anticipate all potential
sources of prejudicial publicity and still avoid the pitfalls of overbreadth and vagueness.
The second is the applicability in many jurisdictions of the collateral bar rule, the conse-
quence of which is to deprive a person charged with violating a silence order of the right to
contest its validity in a contempt or other disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 7-14.
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that such restrictions may be justified only if the following four-
part test is met:
1) Does the restriction advance a legitimate governmental
interest?
2) Does the public comment pose an extremely serious threat to
the governmental interest sought to be protected?
3) Does that threat appear likely to occur imminently?
4) Is the restriction on public comment necessary to secure the
protection or advancement of the governmental interest in
jeopardy?69
While the use of the clear and present danger standard or its
corollary, the serious and imminent threat standard, seem to be
gaining some support from both the bench and the bar, they have
not been universally accepted. 70 Opponents of these standards ar-
gue that there is no compelling point of law which sets these stan-
dards above others in this area. "The question may fairly be said
to be open."'71
3. The Authoritarian Standard
While there is little evidence of widespread support for the au-
thoritarian standard on the federal level, the use of such absolute
prohibitions on extrajudicial comments by trial participants, under
threat of contempt citations, has been used successfully by the
courts in at least three states.
In Ohio ex rel. Leach v. Sawicki72 a Common Pleas Court in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, issued an order prohibiting all extrajudi-
cial statements by the parties involved in a kidnapping and extor-
tion case, regardless of whether such statements were considered
prejudicial. The defendant appealed the order to the Ohio Court of
Appeals which directed that the order be lifted. The lower court
complied, but issued a similar order the following day, reasoning
that this was not a direct gag on the media and, therefore, was not
69. Id. at 3.
70. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Central S.C. Chapter,
Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C.
1977), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1969).
71. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 159, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1973).
72. No. 77-629 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, June 3, 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014
(1978).
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subject to a showing of a "clear and present danger" to a fair trial
in order to be held valid. In June 1977, the Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal on the case without opinion. In January 1978,
the United States Supreme Court refused to review the case.'3
A year earlier, the Fourth Circuit had considered Central South
Carolina Chapter, Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma
Delta Chi v. United States District Court,74 a case stemming from
a widely publicized criminal proceeding involving South Carolina
Senator J. Ralph Gasque. On June 21, 1976, Judge Robert Martin,
Jr. issued an order which read in part:
All participants in the trial, including lawyers, parties, witnesses,
jurors and other officials shall avoid mingling with or being in the
proximity of reporters, photographers and others in the entrances to
and the hallways in the courthouse building, including the sidewalks
adjacent thereto, both in entering and leaving the courtroom and
the courthouse .... 75
Nine days later, the Central South Carolina Chapter of Sigma
Delta Chi and other media organizations sought and obtained a
stay of the order from the Fourth Circuit, and filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus, seeking to have the order vacated.7 6
In January 1977, the court vacated the stay and dismissed the
suit, holding that the writ of mandamus was inappropriate in this
case. The Fourth Circuit also noted that "[t]he order issued by the
district court judge was a result of his judgment that it was neces-
sary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. '77 Relying in
part upon Sheppard and Nebraska Press, the court concluded that
"the Society's right to relief from the order is far from clear and
indisputable."78
While the court cited both Sheppard and Nebraska Press as
outlining standards for the use of gag orders in court proceedings, 79
it expressed no opinion concerning the validity of the order in this
case.
73. 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
74. 551 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as Sigma Delta Chi I).
75. Id. at 561 n.1.
76. Id. at 560-561.
77. Id. at 562.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 562-563 n.3 (recognition of both the "clear and present danger" and "reasonable
likelihood" standards).
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We note only that it [the order] involved the exercise of judgment
by the district court on a question not nearly conclusively settled in
law, especially adversely to the opinion of the district court, that is,
whether, rather than prohibiting the press from publishing informa-
tion already obtained, which the district court did not do, and
which may only be done in extraordinary circumstances not shown
to be present here, it may indirectly prevent the press from ob-
taining information by regulating trial procedures and ordering the
trial participants not to speak with members of the press.80
In Hamilton v. Municipal Court,81 the California Court of Ap-
peals upheld the validity of a district court order prohibiting extra-
judicial comments by all trial participants in a case stemming from
an anti-war demonstration held on the University of California at
Berkeley campus. The order prohibited the release of any informa-
tion or opinion concerning the trial to the media, "other than the
date and place of trial, the names of the parties and counsel, the
contents of the complaint, and the plea of the defendants." s Fur-
ther, the order specifically prohibited public statements or releases
concerning the merits of the complaint, evidence or arguments to
be presented, or trial strategy.88
In Hamilton, as was the case in both Sawicki and Sigma Delta
Chi I, the use of absolute prohibitions on extrajudicial statements
by trial participants was upheld on appeal, without comment on
the validity of the orders themselves. As noted earlier, the use of
this authoritative standard for determining the constitutional va-
lidity of gag orders is rare, but its successful use in these cases
allows it to stand as one possible alternative open to the bench.
4. The "Reasonable Likelihood" Standard
While the Seventh Circuit has considered the reasonable likeli-
hood standard vague and subject to a great deal of judicial discre-
tion,"M the courts which have adopted this standard usually base
their thinking on the dictum found in Sheppard and its endorse-
ment of restraints on trial participants.85 This standard empha-
80. Id. at 562 (emphasis in original).
81. 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
82. Id. at _, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
83. Id. at - 76 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
84. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
85. 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (emphasis added):
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
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sizes the importance of avoiding prejudicial publicity in an effort
to guarantee a fair trial, the limited intrusion on first amendment
interests 6 and the degree to which the individuals restrained are
subject to judicial control.
In Hirschkop v. Snead, 7 the Fourth Circuit noted the split
among the United States Courts of Appeals between the clear and
present danger standard and the reasonable likelihood standard,
and held that this was nothing more than a simple disagreement
between friends. 8 Hirschkop involved a member of the Virginia
State Bar who challenged a disciplinary rule adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia which restricted a lawyer's comments
about pending litigation as unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia rejected the claim that the rule was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, holding that the rule was a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation. 9 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, hold-
ing that the rules designed to prevent prejudice to a criminal de-
fendant arising from a lawyer's comments "would be meaningless
if sanctions could be imposed only when the lawyer's published
speech creates unremediable prejudice." 90
The Fourth Circuit rejected Hirschkop's contention that the first
amendment precludes any rule limiting freedom of speech by law-
yers. The court, noting that "freedom of speech is not absolute,
and [that] courts must consider the 'special characteristics of the
outside influences. . . . Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming within the jurisdiction of the court
should be permitted to frustrate [this] function. Collaboration between counsel and
the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only sub-
ject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
86. The limited intrusion on first amendment interests does not restrain publication but
places only a limited duration restraint on speech outside the courtroom. J. BARRON & C.
DEINES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREss 557 (1979).
87. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
88. The court stated:
[W]e are not certain that any clear and present danger or serious and immediate
harm test would be met, and we see no reason for injecting into the rules the uncer-
tainties which the imposition of one or both of those standards would occasion....
To the extent that it was held in Bauer, however, that the reasonable likelihood test
is constitutionally impermissible in a rule such as Virginia's we simply disagree.
Id. at 368-70 (emphasis added).
89. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1157 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979). The court maintained that "the
proper place for counsel to advocate his informed opinion is in the courtroom on behalf of
his client and not before the public at large." 421 F. Supp. at 1146.
90. 594 F.2d at 370.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
• . .environment' in which speech is uttered,"'I went on to apply
the two-step test outlined by Justice Powell in Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 2 for determining the constitutionality of governmental re-
strictions on speech. "First, the regulation . . . in question must
further an important or substantial governmental interest unre-
lated to the suppression of expression. . . .Second, the limitation
of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental inter-
est involved."9 Quoting the Supreme Court's description in Estes
v. Texas9 4 of the sixth amendment right to a fair trial as "the most
fundamental of all freedoms," the Fourth Circuit held that the
first section of the test had been met.9 5 Moving to the second sec-
tion of the Martinez test, the court began a careful examination of
the effects of rule 7-10796 as applied to criminal, civil and adminis-
trative proceedings.
The court concluded, that while there existed room in the con-
text of a jury trial for "technical violations" of the rule which
ought not result in the imposition of sanctions or charges, such sit-
uations would be considered extraordinary, and thus the rule was
constitutional. 97 Turning to the specific question of the first
amendment rights of lawyers, the court stated:
Lawyers have First Amendment rights of free speech. They are
not second class citizens. They are first class citizens with many
privileges not enjoyed by other citizens. With privilege, however,
goes responsibility, and codes of professional responsibility have tra-
ditionally recognized that a lawyer is subject to special disciplinary
sanctions when he neglects his responsibility to his clients and to
the public. He is equally subject to disciplinary sanctions when he
violates his responsibilities to courts, to other litigants and to the
public when he invokes extraneous influences to deprive judicial
processes of fairness.98
With regard to bench trials,,disciplinary proceedings, civil actions
91. Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
92. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
93. Id. at 413.
94. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
95. 594 F.2d at 363-64 (quoting 381 U.S. at 540).
96. VIRGINIA CODE OP PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 7-107
(1970).
97. 594 F.2d at 364-70.
98. Id. at 366.
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and actions before administrative agencies, the court held rule 7-
107 to be unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. Thus, except
in the context of the jury trial (or the investigation and prior to
the jury trial), rule 7-107 fails to pass the second part of the Marti-
nez text.9
It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit did hold that the sec-
tion of the Virginia rules which "prohibit[ed] a lawyer . . . from
making any statements about 'other matters that are reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial' ,,0o was so imprecise that
"neither the speaker nor the disciplinarian .. . [was] instructed
where to draw the line between what is permissible and what is
forbidden." 10 1 However, this holding did not sway the court from
its belief that the proper standard for determining the constitu-
tionality of gag orders on trial participants should be the reasona-
ble likelihood standard. The court observed that "[w]ith the rea-
sonable likelihood of interference qualification, the rules seem to
be as definite as any set of rules may be. . . .But the injection of
any other standard would make the prohibition, which is now clear
and definite, to some extent unclear and gray." 102
The reasonable likelihood standard has also been employed in
rejecting claims of the media that gag orders on trial participants
infringe upon the constitutional protection accorded newsgather-
ing.103 In Central South Carolina Chapter, Society of Professional
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin,104 the United States Dis-
trict Court for South Carolina held, in an original complaint filed
by the members of the media, that the previous gag order 05 was
not the functional equivalent of a prior restraint. The court noted
"the standard set out in Sheppard that extrajudicial statements of
trial participants . . .may be proscribed if there is a reasonable
99. Id. at 371-74. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
100. 594 F.2d at 371 (quoting VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLI-
NARY RULES, DR 7-107(D)).
101. 594 F.2d at 371.
102. Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
103. For comments on the constitutional protection afforded newsgathering, see
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[w]ithout some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
104. 431 F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977) (hereinafter referred
to as Sigma Delta Chi H).
105. Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. United
States District Court, 551 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1977) (Sigma Delta Chi I). See notes 74-80
supra and accompanying text.
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likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will jeopardize the
defendant's right to a fair trial."106 On appeal the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged the media's right to file suit, recognizing that such
an order could make it difficult for the press to "perform their rep-
ortorial functions. ' 10 7 But the circuit court allowed most of the or-
der to stand, striking down only that portion which banned
mingling on the sidewalks adjacent to the courthouse as being
overly broad. 08 In an apparent contradiction to its previous ruling
(Sigma Delta Chi I),109 the court noted that a "mandamus is the
proper remedy to request the relief prayed for here."110
It has been argued that the true value of the reasonable likeli-
hood standard lies in its flexibility. The California Court of Ap-
peals, for example, has noted:
[The reasonable likelihood standard] recognizes that the court is
dealing with contingencies, rather than realities. It does not demand
impossible feats of clairvoyant fact finding: for example, a finding
that future publicity presents a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice, when the court does not even know where
the case will be tried! A "reasonable likelihood" test, on the other
hand, permits the court to consider openly and frankly the many
future variants which collectively may amount to a reasonable likeli-
hood but, by their very contingent nature, can never amount to a
clear and present danger-unless, of course the meaning of that
term is to be so diluted as to make it indistinguishable from its rival
criterion."'
Yet, other courts have viewed this same flexibility as the major
flaw within this standard." 2
106. 431 F. Supp. at 1188 (footnote omitted). See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying
text.
107. 556 F.2d at 708.
108. Id. The media appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court seeking a
stay of the order pending the filing of a writ of certiorari. The request for the stay was
denied May 20, 1977. In August, 1977, the media petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The
Court declined to review the case in January, 1978. Id. at 707, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978).
109. 551 F.2d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 1977) (Sigma Delta Chi I). See text accompanying note 77
supra.
110. 556 F.2d at 707.
111. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 164, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242 (1973).
112. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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C. Procedural Options: A Door Left Ajar
1. Court Recognition of Media Interest
In several cases, the courts have acknowledged that the media
have a right to appear and litigate gag orders aimed at trial partici-
pants on the grounds that such orders unduly restrict the first
amendment right of the media to gather information by restricting
the rights of trial participants to grant interviews to the press.113
Other courts, however, have held that the media have no standing
to challenge such orders unless the individual directly affected by
the order also contests the validity of the order.1 4 Thus, as is the
case with the standards discussed above, the question of the right
of the media to challenge gag orders directed at trial participants is
subject, in large measure, to the disparate interpretation of the
court controlling the proceeding.
2. Notice to the Media
In March 1978, the Florida District Court of Appeals held in
Florida v. Bannister 5 that gag orders restricting media coverage
of a criminal proceeding were illegal unless accompanied by a no-
tice to the media and an opportunity for the media representatives
to have a court hearing. 6 The case involved the kidnapping and
rape of a 15-year-old Girl Scout. The trial judge issued two orders
which, in effect, proscribed all extrajudicial comments by trial
participants.11
The order was issued without notice to the media and was issued
without a hearing on its validity. The St. Petersburg Times,
Tampa Tribune, Bradenton Herald and station WFLA-TV chal-
lenged the order in the Florida District Court of Appeals. on the
grounds that the first amendment prohibits courts from con-
ducting any portion of a trial in secret. Further, the media argued
that the issuance of such orders without notice or hearing was a
violation of due process as it precluded the possibility of the media
to be heard. 1 ' In finding for the media, the court of appeals noted
that in future trials the judge "must conduct a hearing prior to
113. See, e.g., 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977) (Sigma Delta Chi II); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
114. See, e.g., 551 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1977) (Sigma Delta Chi I).
115. 3 MEDIA L. RPTR. (BNA) 1997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
116. Id. at 1998.
117. Id.
118. Notice Ordered For Gags, 2 NEws MEDIA & THE LAW 13 (July 1978).
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commencement of the criminal trial at which all interested parties
may present arguments concerning the needs and propriety of the
restraints." 119
Federal and state courts in Pennsylvania, New York, and Minne-
sota, as well as the ABA standards of fair trial and free press, have
also advocated giving the media notice of a proposed gag order and
an opportunity to be heard in some fashion prior to the enforce-
ment of the order, or immediately afterwards. 20 Other courts,
however, such as the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, have ignored the press's request for no-
tice and a hearing without specifically ruling that notice was or was
not required.1 21 At least two decisions on notice and hearing for
media gag orders-one requiring notice and the other not requiring
notice-have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court
and in both cases the Court has denied certiorari.22
III. CONCLUSION
In the six years since Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court has
had more than a dozen opportunities to deal with the question of
the constitutionality of gag orders aimed at trial participants. In
each case, however, the Court has allowed the decisions of the
lower courts to stand without comment on the constitutional valid-
ity of such orders. 28 In some of these cases the decision may be
viewed as supporting the media, while other decisions may be seen
as supporting the judiciary.1 24 In either instance, the net result has
been confusion and inconsistency within the judicial system. It has
been argued that the Court has intentionally ignored this issue in
hopes that its inaction will bring about a concensus in the lower
courts.125 This has not been the case. Indeed, "[t]he evidence so far
indicates that the conflict among the lower courts on the gag order
119. 3 MEDIA L. RPTR. (BNA) at 1998 (emphasis added).
120. Inaction Continues Gag Chaos, 2 NEws MEDIA & THE LAW 4 (Apr.-May 1978).
121. Id.
122. 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir.) (Sigma Delta Chi II) (notice not required), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1977); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1974) (notice required), cert.
denied sub nom. Ditter v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc., 419 U.S. 1096 (1975).
123. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 49 U.S.L.W. 4604 (U.S. June 1, 1981) (No. 80-441);
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Schiavo,
504 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub noma. Ditter v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.,
419 U.S. 1022 (1975).
124. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
125. Inaction Continues Gag Chaos, 2 NEws MEDIA & THE LAW 4 (Apr.-May 1978).
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question, if anything, is increasing, leaving the press and the bench
in a state of complete confusion.
1 26
The realities of the situation are clear. There is a valid state in-
terest in the preservation of a fair trial which must be maintained.
The question becomes how can this goal be accomplished with a
minimum encroachment on first amendment rights. Of the four
standards detailed above, only the clear and present danger stan-
dard or its corollary, the serious and imminent threat standard,
can be seen as posing the least possible interference with first and
sixth amendment rights of both the trial participant and the
media.
This conclusion is based on several points. First, the use of the
authoritarian standard calling for absolute prohibition precludes
any possibility of extrajudicial comments, no matter how trivial or
innocuous. This appears to be overbreadth taken to its extreme.
Second, the use of the free speech standard calling for an open
proceeding, in its attempt to prevent interference with first amend-
ment liberties, runs a substantial risk of seriously encroaching
upon the sixth amendment guarantees of the accused. It is obvious
that neither of these "all-or-nothing" approaches can adequately
balance first and sixth amendment interests.
Third, by eliminating the two extremes one is left with a choice
between the clear and present danger standard and the reasonable
likelihood standard for determining the constitutionality of judicial
gag orders. This appears to be the point at which the majority of
the nation's judiciary has arrived. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have held that the clear and present danger stan-
dard, or its corollary, is best suited to this problem, while the First,
Second, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have chosen the reasonable
likelihood standard. The other circuits have either not dealt di-
rectly with the problem or have indiscriminately applied both
standards.
Looking at the standards, the argument raised by the Seventh
Circuit in Bauer becomes clear. The reasonable likelihood standard
suffers, by its very nature, from vagueness. That which is consid-
ered reasonable by one judge may be considered tyranny by an-
other. In Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar Association, the district
court responded to this criticism noting, "[t]he use and meaning of
126. Id.
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the word 'reasonable' is as familiar to a lawyer as is the meaning of
the word 'faith' to a priest. Both are difficult to define but a lawyer
knows what reasonable means just as a priest knows what faith
means."127 Unfortunately, lawyers are not the only trial partici-
pants who have been subjected to gag orders, and it would not be
"reasonable" to assume that all trial participants (i.e. witnesses,
defendants, law enforcement personnel, etc.) are as well versed in
the law as the court's hypothetical lawyer.
The use of the clear and present danger standard as outlined by
the ABA's fair trial and free press guidelines128 appears to be the
most workable solution to this question. This standard not only
protects the governmental interests in a fair and impartial trial,
but it recognizes the rights of freedom of expression (and indi-
rectly, freedom of the press) as well. The addition of a fifth part to
the ABA's recommended test would strengthen it even more, how-
ever. By adopting the least drastic means test as put forth in
Shelton v. Tucker1 29 into the ABA's guidelines, the standard would
be complete. This addition would bring the standards by which gag
orders on trial participants are judged in line with those governing
the use of such orders directed at the media, and equal protection
would thus be afforded to both classifications. For regardless of
how diligent the Court is in preserving the right of the media to
publish information in its possession, this right becomes meaning-
less if the media are denied access to the sources of that
information.
At the present, however, confusion appears to reign on the sub-
ject of gagging trial participants, with a variety of standards being
applied to similar situations across the nation. Thus, there appears
to be little likelihood that this situation will improve significantly
until such time as the Supreme Court decides to take affirmative
action in this area.
127. 421 F. Supp. at 1148.
128. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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